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I. A Comparative Perspective 
 
  
The incorporation of a right to (the protection of) a healthy environment in the Constitution or 
an obligation for the government to protect the environment or to make careful use of the 
country's natural resources has become a very popular notion over the last few decades. The 
constitutions of over a hundred countries presently contain such a provision in some form or 
other2. Some authors hold the view that states which have not yet incorporated such a 
provision in their Constitution should do so as soon as possible. Hayward3, who made an in-
depth study of this subject, puts it this way: “A human right to an environment adequate for 
one's health and well-being is not a luxury. Moral consistency dictates it should apply equally 
to all”. 
                                                 
1
 The first part of this paper is based on L. Lavrysen & J. Theunis, “The right to the protection of a healthy 
environment in the Belgian Constitution: retrospect and international perspective”, in: I. Larmuseau (ed.), 
Constitutional rights to an ecologically balanced environment, (V.V.O.R.-Report; 2007/2), Gent, Vlaamse 
Vereniging voor Omgevingsrecht, 2007, 9-29. The second part is based on L. Lavrysen, “The Aarhus 
Convention: Between Environmental Protection and Human Rights”, in: X., Liège, Strasbourg, Bruxelles: 
parcours des droits de l’homme. Liber amicorum Michel Melchior, Limal, Anthémis, 2010, 647-671. 
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 Shelton and Kiss list the following countries in which that is the case: Angola, Argentina, Azerbaijan, Belgium, 
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Togo, Chad, Turkmenistan, Turkey, Venezuela, Vietnam, Byelorussia, Zambia, South Africa, South Korea, 
Switzerland (D. Shelton and A. Kiss, Judicial Handbook on Environmental Law, United Nations Environment 
Programme, Nairobi, 2005, p. 7). France has recently joined this list. See M. Prieur, “L’importance de la réforme 
constitutionnelle”, Revue juridique de l’environnement, 2003, special issue, pp. 7-11; Y. Jegouzo, “La genèse de 
la charte constitutionnelle de l'environnement", Revue juridique de l' environnement, 2003, special issue, pp. 23-
34; Ph. Billet, "La constitutionnalisation du droit de l'homme à l’environnement: regard critique sur le projet de 
loi constitutionnelle relative à la charte de l’environnement”, Revue juridique de l’environnement, 2003, special 
issue, pp. 35-43; R. Romi, “Les principes du droit de l’environnement dans la ‘charte constitutionnelle’: ‘jouer le 
jeu’ ou mettre les principes ‘hors jeu’?”, Revue juridique de l’environnement, 2003, special issue, pp. 45-49; D. 
Perben, “Ouverture des travaux”, Conférence des Présidents des Cours suprêmes des états francophones 
d'Afrique sur la contribution du droit au développement durable, Conference Proceedings of 3 and 4 February 
2005, Court of Cassation, Paris, 2005, pp. 33-35. 
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Even more important than the inclusion of a clause in the Constitution is of course the 
question how such a clause can be enforced in practice. To use Hayward’s words, “It will 
only apply to all if it is enforced, and, in a world still divided into states, it has to be enforced 
in the present epoch by states. That is why I have maintained in this book that the right ought 
to figure among the most fundamental commitments of a state as a fundamental right of the 
constitution. This will not be sufficient to guarantee effective enjoyment of the substance of the 
right for all people, but I believe that on balance the arguments show it would be wrong to 
deny that it is necessary”. 
 
In some countries this constitutional right is treated as a subjective right. In Argentina, for 
example, it is considered a subjective right which enables any person to institute legal 
proceedings to protect the environment. In the case of Irazu Margarita v Copetro SA, the 
Camara Civil y Commercial de la Plata ruled, “The right to live in a healthy and balanced 
environment is a fundamental right for the people. Any damage to the environment eventually 
results in damage to life itself and to the mental and physical integrity of the person"4. Similar 
case-law came about in Colombia and Chile. In the case of Fundepublico v Mayor of 
Bugalagrande y otros, the Juzgado Primero Superior of Tulua (Colombia) held that “it should 
be acknowledged that a healthy environment is a conditio sine qua non for life itself and that 
no right can be exercised in a greatly damaged environment”5. The Colombian Constitutional 
Court ruled that the right to a healthy environment is better protected by so-called class 
actions when special circumstances threaten to infringe the constitutional and legal rights of 
an unspecified number of persons6. In a case of unauthorized intensive pig farming in a 
residential area, the Court found that there was sufficient evidence that the stench and 
pollution that was caused infringed the petitioner’s right to a healthy environment7. The 
Supreme Court of Chile accepted the interest of a number of petitioners in protesting against a 
large-scale deforestation project, saying that the Constitution does not require that the directly 
affected local residents themselves institute the action for the protection of constitutional 
rights8. The Supreme Court of Uganda ruled that Article 50 of the Constitution, which 
enshrines the right to a healthy environment, entitles the petitioners to take legal action in the 
public interest since the importance of fundamental rights outweighs technical procedural 
                                                 
4
 Judgment of 10 May 1993, cited in D. Shelton and A. Kiss, o.c., p. 7. This case-law was upheld in Camara 
Federal de Apelaciones de la Plata, Sala 2a, 8 July 2003, Asociacion Para la Proteccion del Medio Ambiente y 
Educacion Ecologica “18 De Octubre” v Aguas Argentinas SA, y.o., Compendium of Summaries of Judicial 
Decisions in Environment-Related Cases, United Nations Environment Programme, Nairobi, 2005, p. 65. 
5
 Judgment of 19 December 1991, cited in D. Shelton and A. Kiss, o.c., p. 7. 
6
 Constitutional Court of Colombia, José Cuesta Novoa and Milciades Ramirez Melo v the Secretary of Public 
Health of Bogota, 17 May 2005, Compendium of Summaries of Judicial Decisions in Environment-Related 
Cases, o.c., p. 77. 
7
 Constitutional Court of Colombia, Maria Elena Burgos v Municipality of Campoalegre (Huila), 27 February 
1997, Compendium of Summaries of Judicial Decisions in Environment-Related Cases, o.c., p. 79. 
8
 Supreme Court of Chile, Antonio Horvath Kiss and others v National Commission for the Environment, 19 
March 1997, Compendium of Summaries of Judicial Decisions in Environment-Related Cases, o.c., p. 72. The 
action was founded on the infringement of the equality principle, the right to a healthy environment, the right to 
engage in economic activities that are not contrary to good morals, public order and national security, and right 
of ownership. Another Chilean court ordered the remediation and closure of an unhealthy public dumping site 
for infringement of the right to a healthy environment for the local residents: Corte Suprema, Aurelio Vargas and 
others v Municipalidad de Santiago and others (The Lo Errazuriz Case), 27 May 1987, Compendium of 
Summaries of Judicial Decisions in Environment-Related Cases, o.c., p. 74. A Court of Appeal ordered the 
discontinuation of large-scale water collection from Lake Chungara, which was liable to cause serious 
salinization of farmland, for infringement of the right to a healthy environment: Corte de Apelaciones, CODEFF 
v Minister of Public Works and others, 21 August 1985, Compendium of Summaries of Judicial Decisions in 
Environment-Related Cases, o.c., p. 75. 
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conditions9. The Supreme Court of the Philippines ruled that the circumstance that the right to 
a balanced and healthy environment is enshrined in Article 16 of the Constitution, which 
forms part of the Declaration of Principles and State Policies and not of the Bill of Rights, 
does not imply that this right is less important. According to the Court, this right entails, 
among other things, the obligation of a prudent and rational management of the national 
woodland stock. The Court recognized the right of a group of children to protest, in the 
interest of future generations, against a large number of deforestation licenses which had been 
delivered and which would cause very serious damage to the rainforest10. 
 
Attempts to derive a right to a healthy environment from other constitutional rights have been 
more successful in certain countries than in others.  The Constitution of Bangladesh protects 
the right to life, but does not contain an explicit right to a healthy environment. In a case in 
which the Secretary-General of the Association of Environmental Lawyers of Bangladesh 
challenged a water management plan which posed a serious threat to a particular population 
group, the Supreme Court nevertheless held that Articles 31 and 32, which protect the right to 
life, entail that the environment and the ecological balance must be protected and maintained, 
without pollution of air and water, without which enjoyment of life is hardly possible. Any act 
or omission contrary to that infringes the right to life. Consequently, the right of action of the 
association in question was recognized and its action was allowed11. The Indian Supreme 
Court, for its part, ruled that Article 21 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to life, 
comprises the right to the enjoyment of an unpolluted environment, in particular clean water 
and air, and that therefore Article 32 of the Constitution, which provides for actions in the 
public interest to protect the fundamental rights, can be relied upon12. This ruling was upheld 
by the Indian Supreme Court13. Similar case-law has been established in Pakistan14 and 
Kenya15. In Costa Rica, too, the Supreme Court ruled that the right to health and the 
protection of the environment are essential to be able to fully enjoy the right to life16. In the 
United States of America, on the other hand, it was held that the right to a healthy and clean 
environment, which according to the petitioners constitutes the foundation of the nation and is 
                                                 
9
 High Court of Uganda at Kampala, The Environment Action Network Ltd v The Attorney General and the 
National Environment Management Authority, Misc. Appl. N° 39 of 2001, Compendium of Summaries of 
Judicial Decisions in Environment-Related Cases, o.c., p. 35. 
10
 Supreme Court, Juan Antonio Oposa and others v The Honourable Fulgencio S. Factoran and others, G.R. N° 
101083, Compendium of Summaries of Judicial Decisions in Environment-Related Cases, o.c., pp. 143-144. 
11
 Supreme Court of Bangladesh, Appellate Division (Civil), Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v Bangladesh, represented 
by the Secretary, Ministry of Irrigation, Water Resources and Flood Control and others, 45 Dlr 1996, 
Compendium of Summaries of Judicial Decisions in Environment-Related Cases, o.c., pp. 90-91; see also: 
Supreme Court of Bangladesh, High Court Division, Dr Mohiuddin Farooque v Secretary, Ministry of 
Communication, Government of the People’s Republic of Bangladesh and 12 others, Writ Petition N° 300 of 
1995, Compendium of Summaries of Judicial Decisions in Environment-Related Cases, o.c., p. 92. 
12
 Subash Kumar v State of Bihar, AIR 1991 SC 420, Compendium of Summaries of Judicial Decisions in 
Environment-Related Cases, o.c., p. 104; M.C. Mehta v Union of India and others, Air 1988 Supreme Court 
1115, ibid., p. 114; Bandhua Mukti Morcha v Union of India, 3 SCC 161 (1984). 
13
 Supreme Court of India, M.C. Mehta v Kamal Nath and others (1997), 1 Supreme Courts Cases, 388, 
Compendium of Summaries of Judicial Decisions in Environment-Related Cases, o.c., p. 96. 
14
 Supreme Court, General Secretary, West Pakistan Salt Miners Labour Union (Cba) Khewra, Khelum v The 
Director, Industries and Mineral Development, Punjab Lahore, 1996 Sc Mr 2061, Compendium of Summaries of 
Judicial Decisions in Environment-Related Cases, o.c., p. 139; Supreme Court, Ms Shehla Zia and others v 
Wapda, Human Rights Case N° 15-K of 1992, Compendium of Summaries of Judicial Decisions in 
Environment-Related Cases, o.c., pp. 141-142. 
15
 High Court of Kenya at Nairobi, Peter K. Waweru v Republic of Kenya, Misc. Civil Application N° 118 of 
2004, 2 March 2006, n.y.r. 
16
 Sala Constitucional de la Corte Supreme de Justicia, Decision N° 6918/94, 25 November 1994, Presidente de 
la sociedad Marlene SA v Municipalidad de Tibas. 
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guaranteed by the laws and the Constitution of the United States of America, cannot be 
inferred from the Fourteenth Amendment, nor from any other provision of the Constitution17. 
The Spanish Constitution of 1978 contains a detailed Article 45 on environmental 
protection18. It provides19: 
“1. Every person has the right to enjoy an environment that is appropriate to his development 
and the duty to conserve it. 
2. The public authorities shall see to the rational use of all the natural resources in order to 
protect and improve the quality of life, to defend and restore the environment, by relying 
on the essential collective solidarity. 
3. Those who infringe the provisions of the foregoing paragraph shall be liable, under the 
terms to be established by law, for criminal penalties or, where appropriate, for 
administrative penalties, and shall be obliged to repair the damage caused.” 
The article in question figures in the third chapter of Title I of the Constitution on the guiding 
principles of social and economic policy. Those principles, while appearing under Title I of 
the Constitution, which deals with fundamental rights, benefit from a lesser degree of 
protection than those contained in the first chapter of the same title, which deals with 
fundamental rights and public liberties, and those contained in the second chapter of the same 
title, which concerns rights and freedoms. According to Article 53(3) of the Constitution, 
those principles serve as guidelines for the legislature, for legal practice and for the activities 
of the various public authorities. However, they can only be invoked in a court of law under 
the conditions laid down in the laws that implement those principles20. Nevertheless, the 
Spanish Supreme Court held that they are not merely simple rules whose effectiveness is 
confined to the field of rhetoric and semantics. On the contrary, they are vital and living 
principles which steer and restrict the way in which the authorities exercise their powers. The 
Court considered that Article 45 of the Constitution, although it does not establish a subjective 
right, is actually a directly applicable rule that must be enforced by the public authorities. As a 
consequence of the place of Article 45 in the Constitution, the provision does not suffice to 
support a constitutional appeal (the so-called amparo) or the special procedure to protect the 
fundamental rights (procedure pursuant to Act n° 62/1978). Partly under the influence of the 
case-law of the European Court of Human Rights, certain forms of environmental disruption 
now come under the heading of the constitutional right to physical and moral integrity and the 
inviolability of the home, constitutional rights which are enforceable before the Constitutional 
Court. This is in particular the case with serious forms of noise pollution. Since 2001, the 
Constitutional Court has gradually come to recognize the right to silence as being part of 
those constitutional rights21. 
 
                                                 
17
 US District Court, Southern District, Texas, Tanner v Armco Steel Corporation, 8 March 1972, Compendium 
of Summaries of Judicial Decisions in Environment-Related Cases, o.c., p. 57. 
18
 The Greek Constitution, too, has a similarly well-elaborated Article 24, which plays an important role in the 
case-law of the Greek Council of State: J. Iliopoulos-Strangas and G. Leventis, “La Protection des droits sociaux 
fondamentaux dans l'ordre juridique de la Grèce”, in J. Iliopoulos-Strangas (Ed.), La protection des droits 
sociaux fondamentaux dans les Etats membres de l’Union européenne, Athens – Brussels – Baden-Baden, Ant. 
N. Sakkoulas – Bruylant – Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2000, pp. 432-434.  
19
 Translated into French by L. Oliveira Porto Silvero, in: M. Consuelo Alonso Garcia, “La protection juridique 
contre le bruit dans la jurisprudence du Tribunal Constitutionnel espagnol”, Revue européenne de droit de 
l’environnement, 2006, p. 38. 
20
 M. Rodriguez-Pinero, “La Protection des droits sociaux fondamentaux dans l'ordre juridique de l’Espagne”, in 
J. Iliopoulos-Strangas (Ed.), La protection des droits sociaux fondamentaux dans les Etats membres de l’Union 
européenne, Athens – Brussels – Baden-Baden, Ant. N. Sakkoulas – Bruylant – Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 
2000, p. 263. 
21
 Constitutional Court, Plenary Chamber, N° 119/2001, 24 May 2001, N° 16/2004, 23 February 2004. For an 
analysis of this case-law, see: M. Consuelo Alonso Garcia, l.c., pp. 48-56. 
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II. What the Belgian Constitution Says 
 
 
The right to the protection of a healthy environment forms part of the economic, social and 
cultural rights which have been enshrined in the Belgian Constitution since 1994. They are 
formulated as follows: 
 “Everyone has the right to lead a life in conformity with human dignity. To this end, the 
laws, decrees and rulings alluded to in Article 134 guarantee, taking into account 
corresponding obligations, economic, social and cultural rights, and determine the conditions 
for exercising them.  
 These rights include notably: […] 
1° the right to employment and to the free choice of a professional activity in the framework 
of a general employment policy, aimed among others at ensuring a level of employment that is 
as stable and high as possible, the right to fair terms of employment and to fair remuneration, 
as well as the right to information, consultation and collective negotiation;  
2° the right to social security, to health care and to social, medical and legal aid;  
3° the right to have decent accommodation;  
4° the right to enjoy the protection of a healthy environment;  
5° the right to enjoy cultural and social fulfillment” 
This article of the Constitution was extensively debated by the constitutional legislator22, yet 
the right to the protection of a healthy environment was given relatively little thought23.  What 
is certain, though, is that the term “healthy environment” is broadly interpreted24. As appears 
from the parliamentary preparations, every person has “the right to a decent, healthy and 
ecologically balanced environment”25, and “The government has a special responsibility to 
ensure that future generations still have a livable environment. Its task in this respect is a very 
broad one. It not only covers conservation, but also the controlling of water, air and soil 
pollution, a proper planning of the available space and of farming and stockbreeding 
activities, and the promotion of environmentally-friendly technologies in industry and 
communications”26. 
 
So although “healthy environment” is a broad concept, the most pressing question for the 
citizen, and especially for the practicing lawyer, concerns the enforceability – and therefore 
the practicability – of the right to the protection of a healthy environment. As is often the case, 
the parliamentary preparations give little to go on: “Once the constitutional legislator has 
issued a constitution, the politicians have no more control over it, and the rules are allowed to 
lead a life of their own in legal practice. This also applies to rules deriving from ordinary 
laws, yet the problem is even greater for the rules of a constitution, because such rules serve 
                                                 
22
 For a detailed discussion, see G. Maes, De afdwingbaarheid van sociale grondrechten, Antwerp, Intersentia, 
2003, pp. 393-485. 
23
 For a brief discussion of the relevant passages from the parliamentary preparations, see J. Theunis and B. 
Hubeau, “Het grondwettelijk recht op de bescherming van een gezond leefmilieu. Artikel 23, derde lid, 4°, van 
de grondwet: draagwijdte en belang voor een goede ordening van de ruimte”, T.R.O.S. 1997, pp. 329-345. 
24
 L. Lavrysen, o.c., p. 664. 
25
 Parl. St., Senate, B.Z. 1991-1992, n° 100-2/3°, p. 20; Parl. St. House of Representatives, B.Z. 1991-1992, n° 
391/1, p. 12. According to certain case-law, protection may even cover the aesthetic aspect of the environment: 
Marche-en-Famenne, Justice of the Peace, 21 February 1995, J.L.M.B., 1995, p. 1301, note by M.C. Coppieters. 
Cf. Council of State, Schweren, no. 75.557, 6 August 1998, and Council of State, Dossogne, no. 77.497, 9 
December 1998. 
26
 Parl. St., Senate, B.Z. 1991-1992, n° 100-2/1°, p. 10. 
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in a broad sense as guiding principles for law and society”27. Furthermore, the parliamentary 
preparation of Article 23 of the Constitution is – to put it mildly – hardly an example of 
clarity. It was repeatedly – mille fois répétée28 - emphasized that since the rights mentioned in 
that article have no direct effect, no subjective rights can be derived from them29. They are 
primarily meant to serve as guiding principles for government policy and to instruct the 
legislature30. However, the more it is stressed that something is not meant to have a particular 
attribute, the more the impression is given that it really is supposed to have that attribute31. 
Unwittingly, the constitutional legislator concedes this. Although it wishes to deny the 
socioeconomic rights any direct effect, it nevertheless believes that in several respects they 
have a “real import in positive law”32. In fact an academic voice33 in the parliamentary debate 
pointed out that “a text can be said to have indirect effect, but irrespective of what the 
legislature has to say about it, the legal doctrine and case-law will subsequently decide 
whether or not that text has direct effect”34, yet this suggestion was not taken seriously35. 
Maes concludes, “It is very difficult, if not virtually impossible, to infer the exact intention of 
the constitutional legislator from the parliamentary preparations, since it is hard to escape the 
impression that the constitutional legislator adopted an ambiguous stance during the 
preparations”36. 
 
Firstly, the parliamentary preparation of Article 23 of the Constitution suggests that the 
fundamental economic, social and cultural rights are supposed to produce a standstill effect37. 
Environmental policy should pursue not only a healthy environment, but also an environment 
with a standard of health not lower than the existing one. The standstill protection is an 
intrinsic element of fundamental social rights38. However, it is nothing more than a special 
                                                 
27
 J. Verschuuren, Het grondrecht op bescherming van het leefmilieu, Zwolle, Tjeenk Willink, 1993, p. 339. See 
also on the concept of “life in conformity with human dignity” in Article 23 of the Constitution, P. Martens, 
Théories du droit et pensée juridique contemporaine, Collection de la Faculté de droit de l'Université de Liège, 
Brussels, Larcier, 2003, p. 73: “The concept is so vague, its substance so indiscernible, that by incorporating it in 
a statute, the constitutional legislator in effect delegates constitutional powers to the courts”. 
28
 P. Martens, “L’insertion des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels dans la Constitution”, R.B.D.C. 1995, p. 
7. 
29
 See Parl. St., Senate, B.Z. 1991-1992, n° 100-2/1°, p. 4, n° 100-2/3°, pp. 4 and 11, and n° 100-2/4°, pp. 5, 14, 
20, 70-74, e.g. last p. 5: “The fundamental social rights, on the other hand, must not have direct effect, and the 
working party felt that this had to emerge unequivocally and explicitly from the text of the proposal, and it will 
be repeated whenever necessary.” 
30
 Parl. St., Senate, B.Z. 1991-1992, n° 100-2/3°, p. 13. See also Parl. St., Senate, n° 100-2/4°, pp. 13 and 41, 
and Parl. St., House of Representatives, B.Z. 1991-1992, n° 381/1, p. 9. 
31
 See in the same sense G. Maes, o.c., p. 441: “The energy which the constitutional legislator displayed during 
the discussions to indicate that this provision has no direct effect leads us to maintain on the contrary that, as a 
rule, the fundamental rights enshrined in the Constitution really do have direct effect.” 
32
 Parl. St., Senate, n° 100-2/4°, p. 5 
33
 Professor D. Pieters, who was heard by a subcommittee of the House of Representatives 
34
 Parl. St., Senate, n° 100-2/4°, p. 71 
35
 Ibid.: “He appears to insinuate that even if the constitutional legislator expressly decides that a particular text 
has indirect effect, case-law can subsequently contend, against the legislator’s will, that the text does have direct 
effect. The Chairman does not agree with this.” 
36
 G. Maes, o.c., p. 440 
37
 Parl. St., Senate, B.Z. 1991-1992, n° 100-2/3°, p. 13. See also Parl. St., Senate, B.Z. 1991-1992, n° 100-2/4°, 
pp. 85-87 and Parl. St., House of Representatives, B.Z. 1991-1992, n° 381/1, p. 8. On standstill, see I. Hachez, 
“L’effet de standstill: le pari des droits économiques, sociaux et culturels”, A.P.T., 2000, pp. 30-57, and G. 
Maes, o.c., pp. 109-140 and 460-476 and “Het standstillbeginsel in verdragsbepalingen en in art. 23 G.W.: 
progressieve (sociale) grondrechtenbescherming”, R.W., 2005-2006, pp. 1081-1094. 
38
 G. Maes, o.c., p. 464 
  7
form of direct effect39. The government has a wide margin of appreciation, though only in a 
certain direction. An impairment of the existing level of protection can be penalized by the 
courts. We will discuss this further below.  A second meaning in positive law, to a certain 
extent similar to the standstill effect, lies in a combination of the economic, social and cultural 
rights with the principles of equality and non-discrimination, which are guaranteed by Articles 
10 and 11 of the Constitution. Under those articles, the recognition of socioeconomic rights 
must be ensured without discrimination. According to the parliamentary preparation, an 
infringement of these provisions by a legislative rule qualifies for review by the Constitutional 
Court40. Even though the rule protects a healthy environment for two distinct categories of 
persons, it must not unwarrantedly offer a lesser degree of protection to one category than to 
the other. In this way, too, a lower limit is set to the government’s margin of appreciation. A 
third legal meaning of the economic, social and cultural rights, according to the parliamentary 
preparation, lies in a Constitution-compliant interpretation of laws, decrees and other rules. 
Where they are open to several interpretations, a court of law is obliged to follow the 
interpretation that is compatible with the Constitution41. That means that, in case of doubt, an 
environmentally-friendly interpretation is recommended in principle: in dubio pro natura42. 
According to Jadot, this rule of interpretation is also capable of reducing the public 
authorities’ margin of appreciation in the granting of licenses for activities that are a potential 
threat to the environment. A license ought to be refused if human or environmental health will 
be affected. The same author also holds the view that the right of action should, in the light of 
Article 23 of the Constitution, be broadly interpreted when the protection of the environment 
is at stake. A right (to the protection of a healthy environment) without a right of action would 
be pointless43. So, by and large, a threefold meaning in positive law can be gathered from the 
parliamentary preparation which, contrary to what the constitutional legislator claims, 
amounts in certain cases to a kind of direct effect of the provision in question. But what the 
constitutional legislator seems to fear most of all – and that is the reason why it stubbornly 
insists that Article 23 of the Constitution has no direct effect – is that a fully-fledged 
subjective right would be derived from Article 23 of the Constitution. 
 
What is left, after twelve years of case-law, of the constitutional legislator’s intentions, and 
how practicable is the constitutional right to the protection of a healthy environment at this 
moment? 
                                                 
39
 A. Alen, Handboek van het Belgisch Staatsrecht, Deurne, Kluwer, 1995, n° 660, p. 641. On the concept of 
“direct effect”, see A. Alen and W. Pas, “De directe werking van het VN-Verdrag inzake de rechten van het 
kind”, in Kinderrechtengids, Ghent, Mys & Breesch, pp. 1-25. 
40
 Parl. St., House of Representatives, B.Z. 1991-1992, n° 381/1, p. 9. See also Parl. St., Senate, B.Z. 1991-1992, 
n° 100-2/4°, p. 39 and Parl. St., B.Z. 1991-1992, n° 218/3, p. 18. E.g. Constitutional Court, nos. 50 and 51/2003, 
30 April 2003, and comments by E. Brems, “Grondwettelijke bescherming tegen geluidshinder”, T.M.R., 2003, 
pp. 385-389. 
41
 Parl. St., Senate, B.Z. 1991-1992, n° 100-2/3°, p. 13, and Parl. St., House of Representatives, B.Z. 1991-1992, 
n° 381/1, p. 9, with reference to Cass., 20 April 1950, Arr. Cass., 1950, 517, Pas., 1950, I, p. 560, with 
conclusion by L. Cornil. 
42
 B. Jadot, “Le droit à l’environnement », in Les droits économiques, sociaux et culturels dans la Constitution, 
R. Ergec (Ed.), Brussels, Bruylant, 1995, (p. 257) p. 263. 
43
 Ibid., pp. 264-267. See also P. Martens, o.c., p. 124: “Doesn’t this provision (Article 23 of the Constitution), at 
the risk of being pointless, involve putting in place effective procedures and, consequently, nurturing the concept 
of interest?” See, however, Council of State, Non-profit organization Réserves naturelles, n° 133.834, 13 July 
2004, and Council of State, Non-profit organization Grez-Doiceau, Urbanisme et environnement, n° 135.408, 24 
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rapport à la nature ? », Amén., 2006, pp. 105-114. 
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The development in the case-law is essentially influenced by a twofold catalyst: the special 
legislator on the one hand and the European Court of Human Rights on the other. 
 
By the Special Act of 9 March 2003, the special legislator extended the powers of review of 
the Constitutional Court44. As a result, Article 23 has become one of the constitutional 
provisions against which the Constitutional Court can review legislative acts. As a result, 
indirect review via the equality principle is no longer necessary, so that one of the meanings 
in positive law of Article 23 referred to in the parliamentary preparations has become to a 
large extent superfluous. The review by the Constitutional Court is chiefly carried out on the 
basis of the standstill obligation. Since the state of the environment is very much dependent 
on policy-exogenous factors, we asked ourselves from the outset whether an absolute 
standstill obligation is at all times practicable for the government and whether the courts 
shouldn’t review environmental policy against the proportionality principle rather than simply 
penalize an infringement of the standstill obligation45. In a judgment of 29 April 1999, the 
Council of State already ruled that the constitutional right to the protection of a healthy 
environment “appears to imply, among other things, that a relaxation of current environmental 
standards can only be deemed compatible with the Constitution if there are compelling 
reasons to do so”46. In other words, the prohibition of impairing the existing environmental 
protection is not absolute, but must be weighed against other values in society. The case-law 
of the Constitutional Court has developed along the same lines. Initially, the Court refused to 
expressly rule on the question whether Article 23, third paragraph, 4° of the Constitution 
implies a standstill obligation47, but in a number of more recent judgments it has expressly 
acknowledged this obligation48. As was already mentioned, what is usually meant by the 
standstill effect is that the level of protection of the guaranteed rights as acquired in the legal 
system must not be reduced; in practice, however, this definition did not solve all the 
problems. Certain questions soon came up. 
                                                 
44
 Special Act of 9 March 2003 amending the Special Act of 6 January 1989 on the Constitutional Court, B.S. 11 
April 2003 (effective date: 21 April 2003). See on this subject B. Renauld, “La Cour D’Arbitrage depuis 2003: 
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Liège, Editions du Jeune Barreau de Liège, 2004, pp. 27-51, J. Theunis, “Het Arbitragehof : 
bevoegdheidsuitbreiding en andere wijzigingen ingevolge de bijzondere wet van 9 maart 2003”, A.J.T., 2003, 
954-960, P. Vanden Heede and G. Goedertier, “Eindelijk een volwaardig Grondwettelijk Hof? Een commentaar 
op de Bijzondere Wet van 9 maart 2003 op het Arbitragehof”, T.B.P., 2003, pp. 458-479, and J. Velaers, “Het 
Arbitragehof ‘derde fase’: de bijzondere wet van 9 maart 2003”, R.W., 2003-2004, pp. 1401-1416. 
45
 J. Theunis, “Het grondrecht op de bescherming van een gezond leefmilieu”, l.c., p. 6 
46
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milieurechtspraak van de Raad van State”, A.J.T., 1999-2000, pp. 413-419. 
47
 Constitutional Court, n° 50/2003, 30 April 2003, B.19; Constitutional Court, n° 130/2004, 14 July 2004, B.5; 
Constitutional Court, n° 150/2004, 15 September 2004, B.12; Constitutional Court, n° 14/2005, 19 January 2005, 
B.17; Constitutional Court, n° 59/2005, 16 March 2005, B.7.2; Constitutional Court, n° 189/2005, 14 December 
2005, B.9; . Whereas the Court expressly recognized the standstill obligation in connection with the right to 
social security (Article 23, third paragraph, 2° of the Constitution), see Constitutional Court, n° 169/2002, 27 
November 2002, B.6.5; Constitutional Court, n° 5/2004, 14 January 2004, B.25.3; Constitutional Court, n° 
123/2006, 28 July 2006, B.14.3. See on this subject I. Hachez, “La Cour d’arbitrage et l’article 23 de la 
Constitution: “Cachez ce standstill que je ne saurais voir ! », note under the aforementioned judgment n° 
150/2004, Amén., 2005, pp. 132-140. 
48
 Constitutional Court, n° 135/2006, 14 September 2006, B.10; Constitutional Court, n° 137/2006, 14 
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113/2010, 14 October 2010, B.3.2; Constitutional Court, n° 133/2010, 25 November 2010, B.7.1; Constitutional  
Court, n° 2/2011, 13 January 2011, B.6.2; Constitutional Court, n° 22/2011, 3 February 2011, B.3.2; 
Constitutional Court, n° 75/2011, 18 May 2011, B.3.1; Constitutional Court, n° 102/2011, 31 May 2011, B.3.2; 
Constitutional Court, n° 58/2012, 3 May 2012, B.2.2. 
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The first question was whether the prohibition of impairing the existing protection is absolute, 
in other words, whether the Constitutional Court needs to nullify the slightest weakening of a 
legislative act for infringement of Article 23 of the Constitution. In the light of the case-law of 
the Court, the answer to this question clearly has to be no. A non-significant weakening is 
permitted. In connection with the protection of a healthy environment, even a significant 
weakening does not automatically result in an infringement of Article 23 of the Constitution; 
this is only the case in the absence of reasons connected with the public interest49. 
 
The second question that arose was: What is the “existing” level of protection? Does this 
mean the level of protection that was in effect in 1994, when Article 23 was incorporated in 
the Constitution, or does it mean the most recent level of protection? The Court takes as its 
point of reference the level of protection offered by the “applicable legislation”50, in other 
words, the level of protection in effect before the last change in the law. This means that we 
have a moving reference point instead of a fixed reference point. Consequently, the progress 
that has been made in the meantime is protected. However, it also means that there is room for 
stealthy decline: after all, a step backwards from time to time is still in keeping with the 
standstill obligation51. 
 
In the same year that Article 23 of the Constitution came into effect, at a time when the 
constitutional legislator had only just finished its work, the European Court of Human Rights 
delivered a judgment which plainly says that, in certain circumstances, every person has a 
subjective right to a healthy environment. The European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR) does not as such contain a right to a healthy environment. Nevertheless, the 
environment can influence the interpretation of the traditional rights and freedoms. The 
government can invoke considerations of environmental protection to justify the restriction of 
a conventional right52, while conversely considerations of environmental protection can also 
influence the judgment of a court of law, more particularly when an impairment of the 
environment also means an impairment of a right that is protected by the ECHR. In the Lopez 
Ostra judgment of the European Court of Human Rights, environmental pollution was 
involved in the interpretation of Article 8 of the ECHR. The nuisance was caused by a waste 
processing plant that had been built twelve meters from the home of Gregoria Lopez Ostra, on 
municipal land and with municipal subsidies but without the requisite license. The gases and 
smells that were produced during the waste processing caused health problems among local 
residents virtually right from the outset, to such an extent even that they had to be evacuated. 
The local authorities ordered a partial closure of the plant, yet despite the absence of a license 
they are opposed to the idea of a total closure. In a judgment of 9 December 1994, the 
European Court of Human Rights decided that the Spanish government had not succeeded in 
striking a fair balance “between the interest of the town’s economic well-being - that of 
having a waste-treatment plant - and the applicant’s effective enjoyment of her right to respect 
                                                 
49
 Constitutional Court, n° 130/2004, 14 July 2004, B.5; Constitutional Court, n° 150/2004, 15 September 2004, 
B.12; Constitutional Court, n° 59/2005, 16 March 2005, B.7.2; Constitutional Court, n° 189/2005, 14 December 
2005, B.9. See J. Theunis, “Het recht op de bescherming van een gezond leefmilieu. Even stilstaan bij de 
standstill”, in Feestbundel milieurecht, Milieurechtstandpunten n° 20, Bruges, die Keure, 2005, pp. 87-90. See 
also Liège, 29 June 2004, N.J.W., 2004, p. 987. 
50
 Constitutional Court, n° 130/2004, 14 July 2004, B.5; Constitutional Court, n° 150/2004, 15 September 2004, 
B.12; Constitutional Court, n° 59/2005, 16 March 2005, B.7.2; Constitutional Court, n° 189/2005, 14 December 
2005, B.9. 
51
 J. Theunis, “Het recht op de bescherming van een gezond leefmilieu. Even stilstaan bij de standstill”, l.c., p. 
90. 
52
 E.g. ECtHR, 18 February 1991, Fredin, ECR, Series A, vol. 192, §48. 
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for her home and her private and family life”53. In this case, given the seriousness of the 
circumstances, the government had failed to respect the balance between the public interest 
and the effective enjoyment by Mrs Lopez Ostra of her home and of her private and family 
life54. Along a similar line of reasoning, the government’s failure to provide information about 
the polluting activities of a factory was found in the Guerra judgment to be contrary to Article 
8 ECHR55. 
 
The best known example from the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights is 
probably the Hatton case, which addressed the issue of the noise from night flights around 
London-Heathrow56. In the first judgment delivered by the ordinary chamber of 7 judges on 2 
October 2001, the European Court ruled that Article 8 of the ECHR had been infringed. In the 
particularly sensitive field of environmental protection, says the Court, mere reference to the 
economic well-being of the country is not sufficient to outweigh the rights of others. States 
are required to minimize, as far as possible, the interference with these rights by all means 
possible, including a full impact study. Since this did not happen, the State failed to strike a 
fair balance between the United Kingdom’s economic well-being and the applicants’ effective 
enjoyment of their right to respect for their homes and their private and family 
lives57.Although in the second and final judgment by the Grand Chamber of 17 judges on 8 
July 2003 the European Court confirmed the applicability of Article 8 of the ECHR in 
environmental cases, it stopped short of awarding special status to the fundamental 
environmental rights. The Grand Chamber took more elements into consideration and, unlike 
the ordinary chamber, eventually tipped the balance in favor of the public (economic) interest. 
A wide margin of appreciation is left to the public authorities58. Meanwhile this case-law has 
been conformed many times59 
 
The case-law of the European Court of Human Rights is also echoed in the Belgian case-law, 
primarily in that of the Constitutional Court. In a number of judgments concerning the 
Walloon noise standards around the airfields of Bierset and Charleroi, implicit or explicit 
reference is made to the Hatton case. In one of those cases, some local residents living near 
the airfield of Bierset derived their argument from the infringement of Articles 22 and 23 of 
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 For a case about noise from nightclubs, see ECtHR, 16 November 2004, Moreno Gomez. 
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schendt de mensenrechten. Kleurt het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens grasgroen?”, T.M.R., 2001, 
pp. 153-157, and R. Van Gestel and J. Verschuuren, “Nachtvluchten aan banden door artikel 8 EVRM”, NJCM-
Bulletin, 2002, pp. 154-162. See also the reference to this judgment in Constitutional Court, nos. 50 and 51/2003, 
30 April 2003, in Brussels, 17 March 2005, Amén. 2005, p. 308, and in EHRM, 20 January 2004, Ashworth and 
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pp. 218-227. 
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 ECtHR, 10 November 2004, Taskin; ECtHR, 26 February 2008, Fägerskiöld;  ECtHR, 7 April 2009, Brândue; 
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the Constitution. According to the Court, it appears from the parliamentary preparation of 
Article 22 of the Constitution, which guarantees the right to respect for private and family life, 
that the constitutional legislator sought the greatest possible concordance with Article 8 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. Briefly, the challenged decree of the Walloon 
Region was based on the principle that the noise thresholds that were set could be exceeded 
for up to ten times over a 24-hour period and that under those circumstances the upper noise 
limit in the main nighttime rooms would not have to be guaranteed. The Constitutional Court 
considered that such a measure is likely to have disproportionate consequences that constitute 
a serious infringement of the residents’ right to respect for their private and family life, as 
guaranteed by Article 22 of the Constitution. Since the argument derived from a breach of 
Article 22 of the Constitution is considered well-founded, the argument, insofar as it is also 
derived from a breach of Article 23 of the Constitution, needs no further examination60. This 
judgment shows that the debate surrounding the “direct effect” of the constitutional right to 
the protection of a healthy environment has to a large extent become irrelevant. As a result of 
the case-law of the European Court of Human Rights on Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights and the case-law of the Constitutional Court on Article 22 of 
the Constitution, that right has become enshrined in the aforementioned provisions, the direct 
effect of which is beyond dispute. Consequently, there appears to be no reason why Article 23 
of the Constitution should be denied the same effect. 
 
The case-law of the Council of State also offers an apposite illustration. While a judgment of 
18 December 2003 confirmed that the economic and social rights contained in Article 23 of 
the Constitution do not “in principle” have direct effect61, the following day an argument was 
found valid that was derived from Article 23 of the Constitution, in conjunction with Article 8 
of the European Convention on Human Rights, since the challenged decision on flying routes 
disproportionately and without compelling reason infringed the right to health and to a healthy 
environment62. In a subsequent judgment, the Council of State ruled that the government has 
the obligation to “guarantee the right to health and the right to the protection of a healthy 
environment equally for all citizens, as enacted in Article 23, third paragraph, 2° and 4°, of 
the Constitution”63. Furthermore, in the judgment of 19 December 2003, the increase in noise 
pollution is regarded as a serious detriment which is difficult to remedy, and this detriment is 
“all the more serious since it infringes fundamental rights that are protected by the 
Constitution, namely the right to a healthy environment and the right to respect for family life, 
which in turn is protected by Article 8.1 of the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”64. In this and in earlier judgments65, the Council of State 
thus invokes the right to the protection of a healthy environment in a curious way in the 
suspension proceedings. For the suspension of an administrative act of government, it is 
required that a serious ground is adduced and that the immediate implementation of the 
challenged act is liable to cause a serious detriment which is difficult to remedy. The Council 
of State clearly considers that the latter condition is fulfilled if the detriment concerns the 
fundamental right to the protection of a healthy environment. This leads to the paradoxical 
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situation that, in the absence of direct effect, no argument can be derived from a breach of 
Article 23 of the Constitution, whereas the risk of such a breach is accepted to conclude that 
there is a serious detriment which is difficult to remedy. Furthermore, as was said earlier, the 
Council of State does accept the standstill effect of Article 23 of the Constitution, which is 
nothing other than a special form of direct effect. 
 
The (constitutional) right to (the protection of) a healthy environment also featured 
prominently in a number of judgments and rulings of the ordinary courts and tribunals. 
Despite objections raised in the legal doctrine66 and a few contrary court judgments67, it 
should be observed here, too, that the constitutional right to the protection of a healthy 
environment can essentially have the same practical meaning as Article 8 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. A number of judgments and rulings expressly refer to a 
subjective right to (the protection of) a healthy environment68. Obviously the issue is not 
primarily the right to a healthy general environment but the right to respect for one’s own 
small piece of healthy environment (NIMBY – Not In My Back Yard!). 
 
What is noteworthy in the case-law of the European legal institutions is that the public interest 
which is weighed against the individual interest is usually the public economic interest. The 
former European Commission of Human Rights had already made the rights of Article 8 of 
the ECHR subordinate to the construction of a dam for a hydroelectric power station69 and to 
the public benefit of a nuclear power station70. The European authorities do not interfere in 
the energy or environmental policy of the Member States, except where the latter exceed their 
(wide) margin of appreciation and, as in the Lopez Ostra, Guerra and Fadeyeva cases, 
infringe a fundamental right in the process71. What is also remarkable is that the domestic 
courts, too, often weigh economic interests against the right to a healthy environment. Such 
case-law need not surprise us. Understood in this way, the fundamental right to a healthy 
environment is an alternative to the right to respect for private and family life and for the 
home, through which, as described above, an environmentally detrimental measure can be 
reviewed against the European Convention on Human Rights and against the Constitution. 
This is aptly illustrated in a judgment of the Court of Appeal in Brussels on night flights at 
Zaventem, in which the Court first denies direct effect to Article 23, third paragraph, 4°, of 
the Constitution and then goes on, in the light of Article 8 of the European Convention on 
Human Rights, to weigh the noise nuisance for the local residents against the economic 
interests of the country72. 
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Following on from that, a recent judgment by the same Court of Appeal should not be left 
unmentioned. This judgment features several aspects of the “meaning in positive law” of 
Article 23 of the Constitution. No fewer than 3200 residents of the North of Brussels 
challenged the different federal government measures to spread the noise nuisance in and 
around the airport of Zaventem. The Court of Appeal established that “the subjective rights of 
the residents of the North and East of Brussels to health, to the protection of their family life 
and to a healthy environment are seriously impaired by the operating practice of aircraft 
flying over their living environment to an excessive degree due to the high frequency of flight 
movements and to the number of flight movements that cause noise peaks above a certain dB 
level”. Firstly, the Court of Appeal refrains from applying the decree of the Brussels-Capital 
Government of 27 May 1999 on the control of noise nuisance from air traffic on account of an 
exceeding of authority. The Court ruled that it is beyond dispute that if the governments of all 
the regions were to enact the same regulations, any normal operation of the national airport 
would become totally impossible. The Court also refers to the obligation to comply with the 
proportionality principle in the exercise of powers, and observes that the regulations for 
controlling noise pollution from aircraft as contained in the Brussels government decree must 
necessarily lead to the disappearance of an economically viable national airport73. What is 
also interesting is the consideration that the federal government is not troubled by the 
standstill rule. It is certain, according to the Court, that if the existing operating level is 
maintained – which may be a legitimate choice of the government – a reduction in the noise 
nuisance for the residents of one area will cause an increase in that kind of nuisance for the 
residents of another area. The interests of one group are neither more nor less worthy of 
consideration than those of the other individuals who have to contend with noise pollution. 
Maximum infringement of the subjective rights of a smaller group can therefore never be the 
norm. The Court of Appeal decided on the basis of the equality principle that the appellants 
are entitled, on pain of a periodic penalty payment, not to have to tolerate more noise nuisance 
than all the other residents of the zones being flown over74. 
 
In this context, we must not lose sight of the fact that the actual circumstances play an 
important part in the assessment, and that an infringement of a fundamental right can only be 
pronounced in the case of an excessive interference with an individual fundamental right or of 
a shortcoming in an obligation of best intents on the part of the public authorities.The 
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European theory of fair balance is essentially an application of the proportionality principle 
and as such is similar to what in Germany is called the Sozialadäquanz. This means that 
certain polluting activities must be tolerated because otherwise a proper functioning of society 
would be impossible. Verschuuren cites the example of road traffic: “Everyone knows that 
road traffic represents a significant health hazard, yet it is accepted because of its importance 
to society (motoring is therefore “socially acceptable”). Only when a particular threat 
becomes so great that it is no longer acceptable does the protective effect of the fundamental 
rights come into play”75. Thus the fear of the existence of a subjective right to (the protection 
of) a healthy environment and the commensurate fear of an excessive control of the judiciary 
over (environmental) policy can be removed by regarding the judiciary’s supervision as a 
marginal review. 
 
 
III. The Aarhus Convention: Between Environmental Protection and  Human Rights 
 
 
3.1. Introduction 
 
International environmental law and international human rights law have to a great extent 
developed separately. Dinah SHELTON, a well known scholar working in both fields of 
international law, observed in this connection: “The international community has adopted a 
considerable array of international legal instruments, and created specialized organs and 
agencies at the global and regional levels to respond to identified problems in human rights 
and environmental protection, although often addressing the two topics in isolation from one 
another.”76  On the international level there is recognition in non-binding declarations that 
there is a clear link between human rights and the protection of the environment. According to 
the Preamble of the Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human 
Environment of 16 June 1972 “Both aspects of man’s environment, the natural and the 
manmade, are essential to his well-being and to the enjoyment of basic human rights – even 
the right to life itself”.  Principle 1 of this Declaration states: “Man has the fundamental right 
to freedom, equality and adequate conditions of life, in an environment of a quality that 
permits a life of dignity and well-being”.  In a few more recent International Human Rights 
Instruments there is some attention to environmental protection. The International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights contains a right to health in article 12 that expressly 
calls on states parties to take steps “for the improvement of all aspects of environmental and 
industrial hygiene”. The Convention on the Rights of the Child refers to aspects of 
environmental protection in Article 24, which provides that States Parties shall take 
appropriate measures to combat disease and malnutrition “through the provision of adequate 
nutritious foods and clean drinking water, taking into consideration the dangers and risks of 
environmental pollution”.  
 
The United Nations has, so far, not approved any general normative instrument on 
environmental rights, although the UN Human Rights Commission has had under 
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 J. Verschuuren, o.c., p. 76. 
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 D. SHELTON, “Human Rights and Environment: Past, Present and Future Linkages and the Value of a 
Declaration”, paper presented on the High Level Meeting on the New Future of Human Rights and Environment: 
Moving the Global Agenda Forward, Co-organized by UNEP and OHCHR, Nairobi, 30 November- 1 December 
2009, p. 2. 
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consideration since 1994 a draft declaration on human rights and the environment77 and has 
appointed a Special Rapporteur on a particular environmental problem, the Special 
Rapporteur on the adverse effects of the illicit movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous 
products and wastes on the enjoyment of human rights78 . The UN Human Rights Council, in 
its turn, adopted on 25 March 2009 Resolution 10/4 on human rights and climate change in 
which it notes that climate change-related impacts have a range of implications, both direct 
and indirect, for the effective enjoyment of human rights including, inter alia, the right to life, 
the right to adequate food, the right to the highest attainable standard of health, the right to 
adequate housing, the right to self-determination and human rights obligations related to 
access to safe drinking water and sanitation. The Resolution recognizes that while these 
implications affect individuals and communities around the world, the effects of climate 
change will be felt most acutely by those segments of the population who are already in 
vulnerable situations owing to factors such as geography, poverty, gender, age, indigenous or 
minority status and disability79. 
Some regional human rights treaties contain specific provisions on the right to a 
healthy environment. That is the case with the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ 
Rights80 and the Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the 
area of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights81,82. As far as Europe is concerned, there is no 
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 The Commission adopted several resolutions linking human rights and the environment, such as Resolution 
2005/60 entitled Human Rights and the environment as part of sustainable development. It called on States “to 
take all necessary measures to protect the legitimate exercise of everyone’s human rights when promoting 
environmental protection and sustainable development and reaffirms, in this context, that everyone has the right, 
individually and in association with others, to participate in peaceful activities against violations of human 
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the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, in particular principle 10, in order to contribute, inter 
alia, to effective access to judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy”. 
78
 The Special Rapporteur was appointed by Resolution 1995/81 (E/CN.4/RES/1995/81). In this Resolution one 
can read: “Affirming that the illicit movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes 
constitute a serious threat to the human rights to life and health of individuals, particularly in developing 
countries that do not have the technologies to process them.” Similar language can be found in subsequent 
resolutions whereby the mandate was renewed: e.g. Resolution 2001/35 on the Adverse effects of the illicit 
movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes on the enjoyment of human rights 
(E/CN.4/RES/2001/35) and Resolution 2004/17 “Affirming that the illicit movement and dumping of toxic and 
dangerous products and wastes constitute a serious threat to human rights, including the rights to life, the 
enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health and other human rights affected by 
the illicit movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous products, including the rights to water, food, adequate 
housing and work, particularly of individual developing countries that do not have the technologies to process 
them” (E/CN.4/RES/2004/17). See on this issue: S. SENSI, “Background note on: Special Rapporteur on the 
adverse effects of the movement and dumping of toxic and dangerous products and wastes on the enjoyment of 
human rights” and “The Adverse Effects of the Movement and Dumping of Toxic and Dangerous Products and 
Wastes on the Enjoyment of Human Rights”, papers presented at the High Level Meeting on the New Future of 
Human Rights and Environment: Moving the Global Agenda Forward, Co-organized by UNEP and OHCHR, 
Nairobi, 30 November- 1 December 2009. 
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 http://www2.ohchr.org/english/issues/climatechange/index.htm. See on this issue: M. LIMON, “Linking 
Human Rights and the Environment. Key Issues Arising from Human Rights Council Resolution 10/4 and the 
June 2009 Council Debate on the Relationship between Human Rights and Climate Change”, paper presented at 
the High Level Meeting on the New Future of Human Rights and Environment: Moving the Global Agenda 
Forward, Co-organized by UNEP and OHCHR, Nairobi, 30 November- 1 December 2009. 
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 Article 24: “All peoples shall have the right to a general satisfactory environment favorable to their 
development”. 
81
 Article 11: “Right to a Healthy Environment  
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explicit recognition in the European Convention on Human Rights of a right to a healthy 
environment, but, as has been explained above, serious harm to the environment, may 
according to the case law of the European Court of Human Rights83 constitute a violation of 
Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life) and, in particular circumstances, of 
Article 2(right to life). 
A particular link between the protection of human rights and environmental protection 
is, as far as the UNECE Region84 is concerned, laid down in het so-called Aarhus Convention, 
which we will discuss in this contribution. 
 
 
 
3.2. From the Rio Declaration to the Aarhus Convention 
 
 
 Rio Declaration and Sofia Guidelines 
 
 
The origin of the Aarhus Convention goes back to Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on 
Environment and Development, adopted during the United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development (Rio de Janeiro, 3 - 14 June 1992), which reads as follows: 
“Environmental issues are best handled with participation of all concerned citizens, at the 
relevant level. At the national level, each individual shall have appropriate access to 
information concerning the environment that is held by public authorities, including 
information on hazardous materials and activities in their communities, and the opportunity 
to participate in decision-making processes. States shall facilitate and encourage public 
awareness and participation by making information widely available. Effective access to 
judicial and administrative proceedings, including redress and remedy, shall be provided.” 
This principle was further developed for the UNECE Region85  in the so-called Sofia 
Guidelines86, endorsed at the Third Ministerial Conference "Environment for Europe" in 
                                                                                                                                                        
1. Everyone shall have the right to live in a healthy environment and to have access to basic public services. 
2. The States Parties shall promote the protection, preservation, and improvement of the environment.” 
Only 15 out of the 25 Parties to the American Convention on Human Rights have ratified this Additional 
Protocol. The USA has not ratified this Protocol. See on this issue: J.D. TAILLANT, “Environmental Advocacy 
and the Inter-American Human Rights System” in R. PICOLOTTI & J.D. TAILLANT (eds.), Linking Human 
Rights and the Environment, Tucson, The University of Arizona Press, 2003, 149-153. 
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 D. SHELTON, l.c., 2-4; C. REDGWELL, “Access to Environmental Justice” in F. FRANCIONI (ed.), Access 
to Justice as a Human Right, Oxford University Press, 2007, 156-157; D. SHELTON, “The Environmental 
Jurisprudence of International Human Rights Tribunals” in R. PICOLOTTI & J.D. TAILLANT, o.c., 1-30. 
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 C. SCHALL, “Public Interest Litigation Concerning Environmental Matters before Human Rights Courts: A 
Promising Future Concept?”, J.Env.L. 2008, 417-453. 
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 The UNECE (United Nations Economic Commission for Europe) region covers more than 47 million square 
kilometres. Its member States include the countries of Europe, but also countries in North America (Canada and 
United States), Central Asia (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan) and Western 
Asia (Israel). Today, UNECE has 56 member States.  
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 On the global level the UNEP Secretariat recently developed “Draft guidelines for the development of national 
legislation on access to information, public participation and access to justice in environmental matters” 
(UNEP/GCSS.CI/8 – 3 December 2009), which were presented to the Eleventh special session of the Governing 
Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum (Bali, Indonesia, 26-26 February 2010).  By Decision 25/11, the 
Governing Council/Global Ministerial Environment Forum took note of the draft guidelines and requested the 
secretariat to carry out further work on the guidelines with a view to adoption by the GC/GMF at its next special 
session. 
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Sofia, Bulgaria, 1995. At its special session on 17 January 1996, the Economic Commission 
for Europe Committee on Environmental Policy (CEP) decided to establish an Ad Hoc 
Working Group for the preparation of a draft convention on access to environmental 
information and public participation in environmental decision-making. After two years of 
negotiations, final agreement on the text of the Convention could be reached. 
 
 
The Aarhus Convention 
 
 
The UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making 
and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters was adopted on 25th June 1998 in the Danish 
city of Aarhus at the Fourth Ministerial Conference in the 'Environment for Europe' process, 
in the framework of the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe (Geneva). The 
Convention, which entered into force on 30 October 2001, has now been ratified by 44 
Parties, including the European Union and, with the exception of Ireland, all Member States 
of the European Union. The GMO Amendment to the Convention, which is not yet in force, 
has been ratified by 25 Parties, including the European Union and 21 of its Member States. 
The PRTR Protocol, which entered into force on 8 October 2009, has been ratified by 25 
Parties, including the European Union and 21 of its Member States. 
The Aarhus Convention links environmental rights and human rights. It acknowledges 
that we owe an obligation to future generations. It establishes that sustainable development 
can be achieved only through the involvement of all stakeholders. It focuses on interactions 
between the public and public authorities in a democratic context and is forging a new process 
for public participation in the negotiation and implementation of international agreements. 
The subject of the Aarhus Convention goes to the heart of the relationship between people and 
governments. The Convention is therefore not only an environmental agreement; it is also a 
Convention about government accountability, transparency and responsiveness. The Aarhus 
Convention grants the public rights and imposes on Parties and public authorities obligations 
regarding access to information and public participation and access to justice87. 
As the Convention has been ratified by the European Union88 it has taken some 
implementing measures that complement the Aarhus Convention within the European Union.  
For the member states of the EU, the Convention and the related EU legislation constitutes a 
complex whole, so that we will discuss the content of the Convention along with the related 
EU provisions89. 
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 Draft Guidelines on Access to Environmental Information and Public Participation in Environmental 
Decision-Making, submitted by the ECE Working Group of Senior Government Officials “Environment for 
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3.3. The substance of the Aarhus Convention and related EU law 
 
 
 Introduction 
 
 
As its title suggests, the Convention contains three broad themes or 'pillars': access to 
information, public participation and access to justice in environmental maters. These three 
pillars are discussed below. However, the Convention also contains a number of important 
general features that should be addressed first. 
 
 
General Features 
 
 
The preamble to the Aarhus Convention connects the concept that adequate protection of the 
environment is essential to the enjoyment of basic human rights with the concept that every 
person has the right to live in a healthy environment and the obligation to protect the 
environment90. It then concludes that to assert this right and meet this obligation, citizens 
must have access to information, be entitled to participate in decision-making and have access 
to justice in environmental matters. The preamble recognizes that sustainable and 
environmentally sound development depends on effective governmental decision-making that 
contains both environmental considerations and input from members of the public. When 
governments make environmental information publicly accessible and enable the public to 
participate in decision-making, they help meet society’s goal of sustainable and 
environmentally sound development. 
The first three articles of the Convention comprise the objective, the definitions and 
the general provisions. The Convention adopts a rights-based approach. Article 1, setting out 
the objective of the Convention, requires Parties to guarantee rights of access to information, 
public participation in decision-making and access to justice in environmental matters. It also 
refers to the goal of protecting the right of every person of present and future generations to 
live in an environment adequate to health and well-being. These rights underlie the various 
procedural requirements in the Convention.  
The Convention establishes minimum standards to be achieved but does not prevent 
any Party from adopting measures which go further in the direction of providing access to 
information, public participation or access to justice (Art. 3.5 and 3.6). The Convention 
prohibits discrimination on the basis of citizenship, nationality, domicile, registered seat or 
effective centre of its activities against natural or legal persons seeking to exercise their rights 
under the Convention (Art. 3.9). 
The main thrust of the obligations contained in the Convention is towards public 
authorities, which are defined so as to cover governmental bodies from all sectors and at all 
levels (national, regional, local, etc.), and bodies performing public administrative functions. 
Although the Convention is not primarily focused on the private sector, privatised bodies 
having public responsibilities in relation to the environment and which are under the control 
of the aforementioned types of public authorities are also covered by the definition. However, 
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 In the initial draft there was no explicit link with human rights and the right to a healthy environment. In an 
early stage of the negotiations the delegation of Belgium proposed to include such a link (see CEP/AC.3/2, 
Annex I). This proposal was replaced in a later stage of the negotiations by a common proposal of the 
delegations of Belgium, Denmark and Italy (see CEP/AC.3/12, Annex II). The latter proposal found its way into 
a slightly adapted version to the Convention. 
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according to Article 2.2 in fine, the definition of “public authority” contained in the 
Convention does not include bodies or institutions acting in a judicial or legislative capacity. 
This has given rise to the question whether decisions that are normally taken by 
administrative bodies, but are taken exceptionally by Parliament on the basis of a specific Act 
of Parliament, such as permitting decisions for activities covered by the Convention, are 
excluded from the scope of the Convention or not91. 
The Meeting of the Parties to the Convention is, according to Article 15, required to 
establish, on a consensus basis, optional arrangements for reviewing compliance with the 
provisions of the Convention. At their first meeting in October 2002, the Parties adopted 
decision I/7 on review of compliance92 and elected the first Compliance Committee. The 
Compliance Committee consists of 9 members who serve in a personal capacity and do not 
represent the countries of which they are nationals. The compliance mechanism may be 
triggered in four ways: (1) a Party may make a submission about compliance by another 
Party; (2) a Party may make a submission concerning its own compliance; (3) the secretariat 
may make a referral to the Committee; (4) members of the public may make communications 
concerning a Party's compliance with the convention93. In addition, the Committee may 
examine compliance issues on its own initiative and make recommendations, prepare reports 
on compliance with or implementation of the provisions of the Convention at the request of 
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 See questions 2a en 2b contained in the reference for a preliminary ruling to the Court of Justice of the EU by 
the Belgian Constitutional Court in its judgment No. 30/210 of 30 March 2010 concerning a Walloon Decree of 
17 July 2008 “concerning some permits for which there are urgent reasons of public interest”. Similar questions 
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when they perform legislative or judicial functions. An example of the former can be found in municipal 
councils, which sometimes serve in both legislative and executive capacities. Where they are acting in an 
executive capacity they are covered by the Convention; where they are acting in a legislative capacity they are 
not. 
The involvement of executive branch authorities in law-drafting in collaboration with the legislative branch 
deserves special mention. The collaboration between executive branch and legislative branch authorities in law-
making is recognized in Article 8. As the activities of public authorities in drafting regulations, laws and 
normative acts are expressly covered by that article, it is logical to conclude that the Convention does not 
consider these activities to be acting in a “legislative capacity”. Thus, executive branch authorities engaging in 
such activities are public authorities under the Convention. 
Conversely, if legislative branch authorities engage in activities outside their legislative capacity, they might fall 
under the definition of “public authority” under the Convention. For example, when the European Parliament 
adopts resolutions on environmental questions or in relation to international environmental agreements, it is 
possibly not acting in a legislative capacity, and some provisions of the Convention might apply. 
It should be mentioned that there is nothing in the Convention that would prevent parliaments or other 
legislative bodies from applying the rules of the Convention mutatis mutandis to their own proceedings. At the 
same time as legislative activities are excluded from the scope of the Convention, the preamble, in its eleventh 
paragraph, invites legislative bodies to implement the Convention’s principles.” 
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 Amended since by Decision II/5 
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 In practice nearly all the submissions to the Compliance Committee are introduced by members of the public, 
mainly environmental NGOs. In early 2010 there was 1 submission by a party about compliance by another 
party versus 48 submissions from the public. The other possibilities of submission have not been used so far. 
See: http://www.unece.org/env/pp/pubcom.htm 
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the Meeting of the Parties and monitor, assess and facilitate the implementation of and 
compliance with the reporting requirements under Article 10.2 of the Convention. Since its 
establishment, the Committee has reached a number of findings with regard to compliance by 
individual Parties.  
The Meeting of the Parties may, upon consideration of a report and any 
recommendations of the Compliance Committee, decide upon appropriate measures to bring 
about full compliance with the Convention. The Meeting of the Parties may, depending on the 
particular question before it and taking into account the cause, degree and frequency of the 
non-compliance, decide upon one or more of the following measures: a) Provide advice and 
facilitate assistance to individual Parties regarding the implementation of the Convention; b) 
Make recommendations to the Party concerned; c) Request the Party concerned to submit a 
strategy, including a time schedule, to the Compliance Committee regarding the achievement 
of compliance with the Convention and to report on the implementation of this strategy; d) In 
cases of communications from the public, make recommendations to the Party concerned on 
specific measures to address the matter raised by the member of the public; e) Issue 
declarations of non-compliance; f) Issue cautions; g) Suspend, in accordance with the 
applicable rules of international law concerning the suspension of the operation of a treaty, the 
special rights and privileges accorded to the Party concerned under the Convention; h) Take 
such other non-confrontational, non-judicial and consultative measures as may be appropriate. 
Finally, it should be mentioned that the Convention is open to accession by non-ECE 
countries, subject to approval of the Meeting of the Parties (Art. 19.3). 
 
 
The First Pillar: Access to Information 
 
 
The information pillar – Articles 4 and 5 of the Convention - covers both the 'passive' or 
reactive aspect of access to information, i.e. the obligation on public authorities to respond to 
public requests for information, and the 'active' aspect dealing with other obligations relating 
to providing environmental information, such as collection, updating, public dissemination 
and so on94.  
 Environmental information is defined in a broad sense. Environmental information 
means, according to Article 2.3, any information in written, visual, aural, electronic or any 
other material form on:  
“(a) The state of elements of the environment, such as air and atmosphere, water, soil, land, 
landscape and natural sites, biological diversity and its components, including genetically 
modified organisms, and the interaction among these elements;  
(b) Factors, such as substances, energy, noise and radiation, and activities or measures, 
including administrative measures, environmental agreements, policies, legislation, plans and 
programmes, affecting or likely to affect the elements of the environment within the scope of 
subparagraph (a) above, and cost-benefit and other economic analyses and assumptions used 
in environmental decision-making; 
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 See on this issue: CH. LARSSEN, “L’accès aux informations sur l’environnement en droit international: la 
convention d’Aarhus”, in Ch. LARSSEN (ed.), Ten years of access to environmental information in 
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Century, Berlin, Lexxion Verlagsgesellschaft, 2006, 51-61. 
 
  21
(c) The state of human health and safety, conditions of human life, cultural sites and built 
structures, inasmuch as they are or may be affected by the state of the elements of the 
environment or, through these elements, by the factors, activities or measures referred to in 
subparagraph (b) above”. 
The reactive aspect is addressed in Article 4, which contains the main essential 
elements of a system for securing the public's right to obtain information on request from 
public authorities. There is a presumption in favour of access. Any environmental information 
held by a public authority95 must be provided when requested by a member of the public, 
unless it can be shown to fall within a finite list of exempt categories. The right of access 
extends to any person, without his or her having to prove or state an interest or a reason for 
requesting the information. The information must be provided as soon as possible, and at the 
latest within one month after submission of the request. However, this period may be 
extended by a further month where the volume and complexity of the information justify this. 
The requester must be notified of any such extension and the reasons for it. There is a 
qualified requirement on public authorities to provide it in the form specified by the requester. 
Public authorities may impose a charge for supplying information provided the charge does 
not exceed a 'reasonable' amount. 
There are exemptions to the rule that environmental information must be provided. 
Public authorities may withhold information where disclosure would adversely affect various 
interests, e.g. national defence, international relations, public security, the course of justice, 
commercial confidentiality, intellectual property rights, personal privacy, the confidentiality 
of the proceedings of public authorities; or where the information requested has been supplied 
voluntarily or consists of internal communications or material in the course of completion. 
There are, however, some restrictions on these exemptions, e.g. the commercial 
confidentiality exemption may not be invoked to withhold information on emissions which is 
relevant for the protection of the environment. 
To prevent abuse of the exemptions by over-secretive public authorities, the 
Convention stipulates that the aforementioned exemptions are to be interpreted in a restrictive 
way, and in all cases may only be applied when the public interest served by disclosure has 
been taken into account. Refusals, and the reasons for them, are to be issued in writing where 
requested. A similar time limit applies as for the supply of information: one month from the 
date of the request, with provision for extending this by a further month where the complexity 
of the information justifies this. Where a public authority does not hold the information 
requested, it should either direct the requester to another public authority which it believes 
might have the information, or transfer the request to that public authority and notify the 
requester of this. 
The Convention also imposes active information duties on Parties (Article 5). These 
include quite general obligations on public authorities to be in possession of up to date 
environmental information which is relevant to their functions, and to make information 
'effectively accessible' to the public by providing information on the type and scope of 
information held and the process by which it can be obtained. The Convention also contains 
several more specific provisions. Parties are required to 'progressively' make environmental 
                                                 
95
 “Public authority” means (Art. 2.2): 
(a) Government at national, regional and other level; 
(b) Natural or legal persons performing public administrative functions under national law, including specific 
duties, activities or services in relation to the environment; 
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information publicly available in electronic databases which can easily be accessed through 
public telecommunications networks. The Convention specifies certain categories of 
information (e.g. state of the environment reports, texts of legislation related to the 
environment) which should be made available in this form. 
Public authorities are also required to immediately provide the public with all 
information in their possession which could enable the public to take measures to prevent or 
mitigate harm arising from an imminent threat to human health or the environment. 
 
 
As far as the European Union is concerned, the original Directive 90/313/EEC on the subject 
was replaced by Directive 2003/4/EC96, to bring EU law into line with the requirements of the 
Aarhus Convention. The Directive, based on Article 175 (1) of the EC Treaty, contains 
minimum requirements for the Member States, so that they may maintain or introduce 
legislation that is more favourable to access to information. Although the Directive in general 
closely follows the Aarhus Convention, it in some respects provides more details, restricts 
even more the conditions under which access to information may be refused, or imposes extra 
obligations on the Member States. The definitions of environmental information (Art. 2.1) and 
of “public authority” (Art. 2.2), for instance, are slightly more detailed than those of the 
Aarhus Convention. The Directive is not only applicable to environmental information held 
by public authorities, but also to information held by others “for” such authorities. The 
Directive contains a specific provision on how public authorities should act in a case they 
believe that a request is formulated in too general a manner (Art. 3.3) and imposes on 
Member States a series of practical arrangements to make access to information provisions 
work (Art. 3.5). It specifies that some of the grounds for refusal may not be invoked when the 
request relates to information on emissions into the environment (Art. 4.2). The Directive also 
goes a little more into detail with respect to the dissemination of environmental information 
(Art. 7 and 9). 
 As far as the EU institutions and bodies themselves are concerned, access to 
environmental information held by such institutions and bodies is regulated by Title II of 
Regulation (EC) No 1367/200697. 
 
                                                 
96
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requests for internal review.  
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The Second Pillar: Public Participation in Environmental Decision-making 
 
 
The Aarhus Convention sets out minimum requirements for public participation in various 
categories of environmental decision-making (Articles 6 to 8)98. 
Article 6 of the Convention establishes certain public participation requirements for 
decision-making on whether to license or permit certain types of activity which may have a 
significant effect on the environment. Article 6, paragraph 1 (a) requires in the first place that 
each Party shall apply the provisions of this article with respect to decisions on whether to 
permit proposed activities listed in annex I. This list is similar to the list of activities for which 
an Environmental Impact Assessment99 or Integrated Pollution Prevention and Control 
licence100 is required under the relevant EU legislation. It should be noted that according to 
paragraph 20 of Annex I to the Convention “any activity not covered by paragraphs 1-19 
above where public participation is provided for under an environmental impact assessment 
procedure in accordance with national legislation” is subject to the obligation of Article 6.  
Similarly, according to paragraph 22 of the same annex “any change to or extension of 
activities, where such a change or extension in itself meets the criteria/thresholds set out in 
this annex, shall be subject to Article 6, paragraph 1 (a) of this Convention”. Secondly 
(Article 6, paragraph 1 (b)), each party shall also apply, in accordance with its national law, 
the provisions of this article to decisions on proposed activities not listed in annex I which 
may have a significant effect on the environment. To this end, Parties shall determine whether 
such a proposed activity is subject to these provisions. Finally, Parties may decide, on a case-
by-case basis if so provided under national law, not to apply the provisions of this article to 
proposed activities serving national defence purposes, if that Party deems that such 
application would have an adverse effect on these purposes. 
The public participation requirements include timely and effective notification of the 
public concerned, reasonable timeframes for participation, including provision for 
participation at an early stage, a right for the public concerned to inspect information which is 
relevant to the decision-making free of charge, an obligation on the decision-making body to 
take due account of the outcome of the public participation, and prompt public notification of 
the decision, with the text of the decision and the reasons and considerations on which it is 
based being made publicly accessible. The 'public concerned' is defined as 'the public affected 
or likely to be affected by, or having an interest in, the environmental decision-making', and 
explicitly includes NGOs promoting environmental protection and meeting any requirements 
under national law. So, Parties to the Convention may set requirements for NGOs under 
national law, but these requirements should be consistent with the Convention’s principles, 
such as non-discrimination and avoidance of technical and financial barriers to registration. 
Within these limits, Parties may impose requirements based on objective criteria that are not 
unnecessarily exclusionary101.  
Article 7 requires Parties to make "appropriate practical and/or other provisions for the 
public to participate during the preparation of plans and programmes relating to the 
environment". It can be argued that the term 'relating to the environment' is quite broad, 
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covering not just plans or programmes prepared by an environment ministry, but also sectoral 
plans (transport, energy, tourism etc.) where these have significant environmental 
implications. Though the Convention is less prescriptive with respect to public participation in 
decision-making on plans or programmes than in the case of projects or activities, the 
provisions of Article 6 relating to reasonable timeframes for participation, opportunities for 
early participation (while options are still open) and the obligation to ensure that "due 
account" is taken of the outcome of the participation are to be applied in respect of such plans 
and programmes. Article 7 also applies, in more recommendatory form, to decision-making 
on policies relating to the environment. 
Article 8 applies to public participation during the preparation by public authorities of 
executive regulations and other generally applicable legally binding rules that may have a 
significant effect on the environment. Although the Convention does not apply to bodies 
acting in a legislative capacity, this article clearly would apply to the executive stage of 
preparing rules and regulations even if they are later to be adopted by parliament102.  
 
 
The EU took several legal initiatives to implement the second pillar of the Aarhus 
Convention. Provisions for public participation consistent with the requirements of Article 6 
of the Aarhus Convention in environmental decision-making concerning concrete activities 
(projects and installations) that could have adverse environmental impacts were introduced in 
both the EIA and the IPPC Directive103. As far as Article 7 is concerned, public participation 
requirements can be found in Directive 2003/35/EC of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 26 May 2003 providing for public participation in respect of the drawing up of 
certain plans and programmes relating to the environment. Furthermore, similar provisions 
can be found in a number of other environmental directives, such as Directive 2001/42/EC of 
27 June 2001 on the assessment of certain plans and programmes on the environment and 
Directive 2000/60/EC of 23 October 2000 establishing a framework for Community action in 
the field of water policy. As far as the EU institutions and bodies themselves are concerned, 
public participation requirements were laid down in Title III of Regulation (EC) No 
1367/2006104. 
 
 
The Third Pillar: Access to Justice 
 
 
 
The third pillar of the Convention (Article 9) aims to provide access to justice in three 
different contexts: a) review procedures with respect to information requests, b) review 
procedures with respect to specific (project-type) decisions which are subject to public 
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participation requirements, and c) challenges to breaches of environmental law in general.  
Thus the inclusion of an 'access to justice' pillar not only underpins the first two pillars; it also 
points the way to empowering citizens and NGOs to assist in the enforcement of the law105.  
 
 
Access to Justice in relation to Access to Environmental Information 
 
 
Article 9.1 of the Aarhus Convention deals with Access to Justice concerning information 
appeals. A person whose request for information has not been dealt with to his satisfaction 
must be provided with access to a review procedure before a court of law or another 
independent and impartial body established by law. The latter option was included to 
accommodate those countries which have a well-functioning office of Ombudsperson that – 
and this is an explicit requirement – takes decisions that are “binding on the public authority 
holding the information”. If such an office can only mediate or issue non-binding opinions, 
such an option is not sufficient. The Convention attempts to ensure a low threshold for such 
appeals by requiring that where review before a court of law is provided for (which can 
involve high costs), there should be also, before it comes to a court case, access to an 
expeditious review procedure “for reconsideration by a public authority or review by an 
independent and impartial body other than a court of law” which is free of charge or 
inexpensive. Final decisions must, as has been said, be binding on the public authority holding 
the information, and the reasons must be stated in writing where information is refused. 
Standing must, under this provision, be granted to “any person who considers that his or her 
request for information under Article 4 has been ignored, wrongfully refused, whether in part 
or in full, inadequately answered, or otherwise not dealt with under the provisions of that 
article”. No additional standing requirements may be imposed106. 
 A very similar provision is contained in Article 6 of Directive 2003/4/EC. Art. 6.2 
adds that Member States may furthermore provide that third parties incriminated by the 
disclosure of information may also have access to legal recourse. 
  
 
 
Access to Justice in relation to Environmental Permitting Decisions 
 
 
Article 9.2 of the Aarhus Convention deals with Access to Justice concerning environmental 
decision-making with regard to activities that may have a significant effect on the 
environment. The Convention provides for a right to seek a review in connection with 
decision-making on projects or activities covered by Article 6 (supra n° 8). The review 
procedure should be organized before a court of law and/or another independent and impartial 
body established by law and make it possible “to challenge the substantive and procedural 
legality of any decision, act or omission subject to the provisions of Article 6”. So, the review 
procedure should not be restricted to the question whether the public participation 
requirements of Article 6 were observed in preparation of permits for activities that fall under 
that provision, but should extend to all questions of legality, both of substance and of 
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procedure. The decisions may be reviewed against all binding law, be it international, 
European or domestic law. The review procedure should also encompass material “acts” 
connected to those activities and omissions. Where so provided for under national law, this 
review procedure is also applicable to decisions, acts and omissions subject to other relevant 
provisions of the Convention. Parties may apply the review procedure to other provisions of 
the Convention by providing for review in those cases. Those may include decisions covered 
by Article 7 (plans, programmes and policies relating to the environment) or Article 8 
(executive regulations and generally applicable legally binding normative instruments).  
The review procedure should be open to “members of the public”, that is to say “the 
public affected or likely to be affected, or having an interest in the environmental decision 
making”, including environmental NGOs “meeting any requirements under national law” 
(Art. 2.5) in so far as they have “a sufficient interest” (notion often used in the legal systems 
inspired by those of France) or “maintain impairment of a right, where administrative 
procedural law of a Party requires this as a precondition” (concept used in the legal systems 
inspired by German law). So, State Parties may impose certain standing requirements for 
members of the public and environmental NGOs, but their room for manoeuvre in this respect 
is not unlimited. Article 9.2, subparagraph 2, states: “[w]hat constitutes a sufficient interest 
and impairment of a right shall be determined in accordance with the requirements of national 
law and consistent with the objective of giving the public concerned wide access to justice 
within the scope of this Convention. To this end the interest of any non-governmental 
organization meeting the requirements referred to in Article 2, paragraph 5, shall be deemed 
sufficient for the purpose of subparagraph (a) above. Such organizations shall also be deemed 
to have rights capable of being impaired for the purpose of subparagraph (b) above”. While it 
is clear that State Parties are not obliged to introduce the actio popularis, they may not 
introduce strict standing requirements for natural or legal persons who may be affected or 
likely to be affected by decisions, acts or omissions concerning such activities, and, as the 
case may be, plans, programmes, policies and regulations. The same holds true for 
environmental NGOs. The Aarhus Compliance Committee was, in this connection, of the 
opinion that the criteria that have been applied by the Belgian Council of State with respect to 
the right of environmental organizations to challenge Walloon town planning permits would 
not comply with Article 9, paragraph 2. The Compliance Committee noted in particular:  “As 
stated, in these cases environmental organizations are deemed to have a sufficient interest to 
be granted access to a review procedure before a court or an independent and impartial body 
established by law. Although what constitutes a sufficient interest and impairment of a right 
shall be determined in accordance with national law, it must be decided “with the objective of 
giving the public concerned wide access to justice” within the scope of the Convention. As 
shown by the cases submitted by the Communicant with respect to town planning permits this 
is not reflected in the jurisprudence of the Council of State. Thus, if the jurisprudence is 
maintained, Belgium would fail to comply with Article 9, paragraph 2, of the Convention”107. 
 Finally, according to Article 9.2, third subparagraph, this provision on access to justice 
shall not exclude the possibility of a preliminary review procedure before an administrative 
authority and shall not affect the requirement of exhaustion of administrative review 
procedures prior to recourse to judicial review procedures, where such a requirement exists 
under national law. The administrative appeal system is not intended to replace the 
opportunity of appeal to the courts, but it may in many cases resolve the matter expeditiously 
and avoid the need to go to court108. 
 Very similar provisions were laid down in Article 10a of Directive 85/337/EEC on the 
assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the environment, as 
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amended by Directive 2003/35/EC, as regards public and private projects that are subject to 
environmental impact assessment in view of that Directive109, and in Article 15a of  Directive 
96/61/EC of 24 September 1996 concerning integrated pollution prevention and control (the 
present Art. 16 of Directive 2008/1/EC concerning integrated pollution prevention and 
control), as regards installations that fall within the scope of that Directive110.  
The Court of Justice of the European Union has ruled that members of the public 
concerned within the meaning of Article 1(2) and 10a of Directive 85/337/EEC, as amended 
by Directive 2003/35/EC, must be able to have access to a review procedure to challenge the 
decision by which a body attached to a court of law of a Member State has given a ruling on a 
request for development consent, regardless of the role they might have played in the 
examination of that request by taking part in the procedure before that body and by 
expressing their views. The right of access to a review procedure within that meaning does not 
depend on whether the authority which adopted the decision or act at issue is an 
administrative body or a court of law111, and participation in an environmental decision-
making procedure under Directive 85/337/EEC is distinct and has a different purpose from a 
legal review, since the latter may, where appropriate, be directed at a decision adopted at the 
end of that procedure. Therefore, participation in the decision-making procedure has no effect 
on the conditions for access to the review procedure. Furthermore, the Court ruled that Article 
10a of Directive 85/337/EEC, as amended by Directive 2003/35/EC, precludes a provision of 
national law which reserves the right to bring an appeal against a decision on projects which 
fall within the scope of that directive, as amended, solely to environmental protection 
associations which have at least 2 000 members. The Court is indeed of the opinion that while 
it is true that article 10a leaves to national legislatures the task of determining the conditions 
which may be required in order for a non‑governmental organisation which promotes 
environmental protection to have a right of appeal under the conditions set out above, the 
national rules thus established must, first, ensure ‘wide access to justice’ and, second, render 
effective the provisions of Directive 85/337/EEC on judicial remedies. Accordingly, those 
national rules must not be liable to nullify EU provisions which provide that parties who have 
a sufficient interest to challenge a project and those whose rights it impairs, which include 
environmental protection associations, are to be entitled to bring actions before the competent 
courts. From that point of view, a national law may require that such an association has as its 
object the protection of nature and the environment. Furthermore, it is conceivable that the 
condition that an environmental protection association must have a minimum number of 
members may be relevant in order to ensure that it does in fact exist and that it is active. 
However, the number of members required cannot be fixed by national law at such a level that 
it runs counter to the objectives of Directive 85/337/EEC and in particular the objective of 
facilitating judicial review of projects which fall within its scope. Furthermore, Directive 
85/337/EEC does not exclusively concern projects on a regional or national scale, but also 
projects more limited in size which locally based associations are better placed to deal with112. 
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Access to Justice and Breaches of Environmental Law 
 
 
 
Article 9.3 concerns violations of environmental law in general. The Convention requires 
Parties to provide access to administrative or judicial procedures to challenge acts and 
omissions by private persons and public authorities which breach laws relating to the 
environment. The Convention introduces in so doing a form of direct citizen enforcement 
which can be used not only against administrative acts, but also against material acts and 
omissions. Omissions include the failure to implement or enforce environmental law with 
respect to other public authorities or private entities113. The Convention uses the terms “which 
contravene provisions of its national law relating to the environment.” In the absence of a 
specific definition of “national law”, it includes not only domestic law (both federal and 
regional), but also European and International law that is binding on the Member States, in 
particular those provisions of international or European law that have direct effect. Such 
access is to be provided to members of the public 'where they meet the criteria, if any, laid 
down in national law' - in other words, the issue of standing is primarily to be determined at 
the national level, as is the question of whether the procedures are judicial or administrative. 
Members of the public include natural or legal persons, and, in accordance with national 
legislation or practice, their associations, organizations or groups (Art. 2.4). The Aarhus 
Compliance Committee has observed that while referring to “the criteria, if any, laid down in 
national law”, the Convention neither defines these criteria nor sets out the criteria to be 
avoided. Rather, the Convention is intended to allow a great deal of flexibility in defining 
which environmental organizations have access to justice. “On the one hand, the Parties are 
not obliged to establish a system of popular action (“actio popularis”) in their national laws 
with the effect that anyone can challenge any decision, act or omission relating to the 
environment. On the other hand, the Parties may not take the clause “where they meet the 
criteria, if any, laid down in its national law” as an excuse for introducing or maintaining so 
strict criteria that they effectively bar all or almost all environmental organizations from 
challenging acts or omissions that contravene national law relating to the environment. 
Accordingly, the phrase “the criteria, if any, laid down in national law” indicates a self-
restraint on the parties not to set too strict criteria. Access to such procedures should thus be 
the presumption, not the exception. One way for the Parties to avoid a popular action (“actio 
popularis”) in these cases, is to employ some sort of criteria (e.g. of being affected or of 
having an interest) to be met by members of the public in order to be able to challenge a 
decision. However, this presupposes that such criteria do not bar effective remedies for 
members of the public. This interpretation of Article 9, paragraph 3, is clearly supported by 
the Meeting of the Parties, which in paragraph 16 of Decision II/2 (promoting effective access 
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to justice) invites those Parties which choose to apply criteria in the exercise of their 
discretion under Article 9, paragraph 3, “to take fully into account the objective of the 
Convention to guarantee access to justice.”114 
 The European Commission tabled on 24 October 2003 a Proposal for a Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on access to justice in environmental matters115. 
The proposal aims to establish a framework of minimum requirements for access to the 
judicial and administrative proceedings in environmental matters in order to achieve a better 
implementation and application of environmental law in the European Union, and to 
implement Art. 9.3 of the Aarhus Convention. The proposed directive grants legal standing to 
certain members of the public, enabling them to have access to judicial or administrative 
proceedings against the actions and omissions of public authorities which contravene 
environmental law. The proposal met resistance from various member states and for the time 
being no qualified majority could be found within the Council, despite the fact that the 
Parliament endorsed the proposal in the first reading on 18 March 2004, subject to certain 
amendments designed in particular to recall the objective of the Aarhus Convention, to extend 
the right to institute legal proceedings to local organisations and/or to organisations promoting 
sustainable development, to clarify the mechanisms for access to justice in transboundary 
environmental cases and to make it easier to exercise the right to go to court, and the 
European Economic and Social Committee delivered a positive opinion.  
As far as the EU institutions and bodies themselves are concerned, some provisions 
concerning internal review and access to justice were laid down in Title IV of Regulation 
(EC) No 1367/2006 in an attempt to overcome the strict standing requirements used in the 
case law of the Court of Justice and the General Court while reviewing the legality of acts 
adopted by EU institutions and bodies on the basis of Article 263 TFEU (ex. Art. 230 EC) 
(actions for annulment)116. Any non-governmental organisation which meets the criteria set 
out in Article 11117 is entitled to make a request for internal review to the EU institution or 
body that has adopted an administrative act118 under environmental law or, in case of an 
alleged administrative omission, should have adopted such an act. Such a request must be 
made in writing and within a time limit not exceeding six weeks after the administrative act 
was adopted, notified or published, whichever is the latest, or, in the case of an alleged 
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omission, six weeks after the date when the administrative act was required. The request shall 
state the grounds for the review. The EU institution or body shall consider any such request, 
unless it is clearly unsubstantiated. The EU institution or body shall state its reasons in a 
written reply as soon as possible, but no later than 12 weeks after receipt of the request. 
Where the EU institution or body is unable, despite exercising due diligence, to act in 
accordance with said obligation, it shall inform the non-governmental organisation which 
made the request as soon as possible and at the latest within the aforementioned period of the 
reasons for its failure to act and when it intends to do so. In any event, the Community 
institution or body shall act within 18 weeks from receipt of the request. Article 12 of the 
Regulation provides that the non-governmental organisation which made the request for 
internal review may institute proceedings before the Court of Justice in accordance with the 
relevant provisions of the Treaty. Where the EU institution or body fails to act in accordance 
with Article 10(2) or (3) of the Regulation the non-governmental organisation may institute 
proceedings before the Court of Justice in accordance with the relevant provisions of the 
Treaty119. It is, however, doubtful that the actual standing requirements used by the Court of 
Justice and the provisions of the aforementioned Regulation are in line with the requirements 
of the Aarhus Convention120. 
  
 
Minimum requirements concerning Access to Justice 
 
 
Art. 9.4 and 9.5 set minimum requirements concerning access to justice which should be 
provided for under Art. 9.1, 9.2 and 9.3 of the Aarhus Convention. Article 9.4 stipulates that 
these procedures should provide adequate and effective remedies, including injunctive relief 
as appropriate, and be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive. Decisions under 
this article shall be given or recorded in writing. Decisions of courts, and whenever possible 
of other bodies, shall be publicly accessible. Injunctive relief is a remedy to prevent or remedy 
injury. The Convention requires injunctive relief and other remedies to be “adequate and 
effective”. Adequacy requires the relief to fully compensate past damage, prevent future 
damage, and may require it to provide restoration. The requirement that the remedies should 
be effective means that they should be capable of efficient enforcement121.  Article 9.5 
prescribes that in order to further the effectiveness of the provisions of Article 9, each Party 
shall ensure that information is provided to the public on access to administrative and judicial 
review procedures and shall consider the establishment of appropriate assistance mechanisms 
to remove or reduce financial an other barriers to access to justice. 
 The requirements of Art. 9.4 and 9.5 are partially relayed by Article 10a of Directive 
85/337 and Article 16 of Directive 2008/1/EC where they require that the procedures “shall be 
fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive” and that “Member States shall ensure 
that practical information is made available to the public on access to administrative and 
judicial review procedures”. For the moment, there is no requirement in the European 
Directives issued for the implementation of the Aarhus Convention concerning the remedies 
that should be provided for by those procedures, or for the establishment of appropriate 
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assistance mechanisms to remove financial and other barriers to access to justice. Therefore, 
for those important requirements one should refer directly to the Aarhus Convention. 
 
 
IV. The Aarhus Convention and national judiciaries 
 
 
Art. 9 of the Aarhus Convention is of particular relevance for the national judiciaries122. In 
most EU countries – but not all – there is a Constitutional Court. Access to the Constitutional 
Court, however, is not always regulated in the same way. The right to lodge an appeal directly 
with the Constitutional Court is usually only open to political authorities, sometimes with 
diversification according to the nature of the regulation against which the appeal is lodged 
(e.g. Poland: the President; Germany: the government; France: the Prime Minister; Portugal: 
the House of Representatives, etc). Direct access for natural and legal persons to the 
Constitutional Court exists only in the minority of EU countries. But in most of the countries 
ordinary courts can refer constitutional questions to the Constitutional Court or a 
constitutional complaint can be lodged against a judicial decision in the last instance. 
Constitutional Courts can play an important role in the enforcement of the Aarhus 
Convention. They generally can combine provisions of their national constitution with 
relevant provisions of international treaties and review not only the constitutionality of federal 
or regional Acts of Parliament (or sometimes also regulations), but also their conformity with 
international provisions, such as those of the Aarhus Convention. Several Constitutional 
Courts have already been confronted with the application of the Aarhus Convention. The 
Belgian Constitutional Court partially annulled by Judgement N° 137/2006 of 14 September 
2006 an Act of the Walloon Parliament for violation of Article 23 of the Constitution in 
conjunction with Directive 2001/42/EC and Article 7 of the Aarhus Convention. The 
Constitutional Court of Slovenia also found an Act (the Act Amending the Lipica Stud Farm 
Act) inconsistent with the Aarhus Convention as its prevents the public from participating in 
the development of a detailed plan of national importance123. 
In the vast majority of the EU member states a dual judicial structure has been put in 
place, with on the one hand ordinary courts and tribunals, which have jurisdiction in civil and 
criminal cases, and on the other hand administrative courts and tribunals. This means that the 
ordinary courts and tribunals are empowered to settle civil and criminal matters, whereas the 
administrative courts and tribunals are empowered to settle administrative disputes. It can be 
expected that administrative courts will be confronted in the first place with Aarhus-related 
cases as the decisions and acts referred to in Article 9.1 and 9.2 and, as far as acts of public 
authorities are concerned, Article 9.3, will normally fall under the jurisdiction of 
administrative courts124. It should be pointed out, however, that the powers of the 
administrative courts might differ from Member State to Member State125. Due to the 
different legal history and legal culture, the various legal systems of Member States have 
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taken different approaches to legal standing. They range from an extensive approach where 
standing is broadly recognised by way of an “actio popularis”, to a very restrictive approach 
allowing standing only in cases where the impairment of an individual legally granted right 
can be shown126. In most of the countries the legislation uses a rather vague formula in 
describing the conditions to have standing. E.g. in Belgium a natural or legal person who 
requests suspension or annulment of an administrative act or a regulation by the Council of 
State must declare a justifiable interest. This means that those persons must demonstrate in 
their application to the Court that they are liable to be directly and unfavourably affected by 
the challenged act or regulation. This concept can however be interpreted broadly or 
narrowly. As we look at the Belgian situation, more or less the same criterion applies for the 
Council of State as for the Constitutional Court. So far, the Constitutional Court has almost 
never declined an environmental NGO for lack of standing. As far as the Supreme 
Administrative Court is concerned, there are some variations in time and even between the 
different Chambers. Where the Council of State developed a broad view on standing for 
NGOs in the eighties, there was a tendency later on to become stricter, maybe in view of an 
ever growing case load. Where the Chambers dealing with environmental legislation 
generally continued to have a broad view, the Chambers dealing with land use planning 
legislation gradually developed a stricter view127. In my opinion, the Council of State may 
reinterpret the existing national provisions on standing without any problem in conformity 
with Article 9 of the Aarhus Convention. To overcome possible further resistance from the 
Council of State, some Members of Parliament introduced, with reference to the Aarhus 
Convention and the Findings and Recommendations of the Aarhus Compliance Committee, a 
bill to clarify under which conditions environmental NGOs have standing before the Council 
of State128. The proposal was adopted by the Senate in an amended form and is still pending 
in the House of Representatives129. The Legislation Section of the Council of State has, 
meanwhile, delivered an opinion in which it suggests different amendments to the text 
adopted by the Senate130. 
As we have seen, according to Article 9.3 of the Aarhus Convention, Member States 
must also ensure that members of the public have access to administrative or judicial 
procedures to challenge acts and omissions by private persons which contravene provisions of 
its national law relating to the environment. If one opts for judicial procedures, such 
procedures will in most Member States be the competence of the ordinary judiciary. Here we 
face similar problems of standing and the views taken by ordinary courts are often even 
narrower than those of the administrative courts. In some of our jurisdictions there is a wide 
access to civil courts, while in others (e.g. the Netherlands, Belgium and France) the legislator 
introduced special provisions to allow Environmental NGOs to ask for injunctions or even 
damages. But the impression remains that in the majority of the Member States the situation is 
far from satisfactory and that a legislative intervention is necessary if the courts cannot or are 
not willing to review their jurisprudence on standing131. 
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Finally, there is Article 9.4 and 9.5 which sets particular quality standards for the 
different procedures provided for in the other paragraphs of that article. These procedures 
shall provide adequate and effective remedies, including injunctive relief as appropriate, and 
be fair, equitable, timely and not prohibitively expensive. These requirements are perhaps the 
most difficult of all to fulfil. In many Member States the judiciary faces a large backlog of 
cases. Waiting a long time for a final decision, in some cases more than 5 years, is an 
everyday reality in more than one jurisdiction. In such circumstances only interim relief is an 
adequate solution, but unfortunately the conditions under which one can obtain interim 
measures are often very severe and not in accordance with the Treaty requirements. In other 
countries judicial procedures and lawyer’s fees are very costly. These issues are difficult to 
solve by the courts themselves and raise more general questions of judicial management, state 
investment in the judiciary and appropriate legal aid schemes. A long-term work program 
seems necessary to solve these problems in an acceptable way. And of course these are cross-
cutting issues that go far beyond the environmental sector. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
